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On the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty this study deals with the historical de-
velopment of Franco-German relations in the 20th century. The focus is on the historical models of 
rapprochement between the two nations. The author presents in detail the possibilities for cooper-
ation in the interwar years (with a special focus on civil integration). This period may be considered 
one of the most intensive periods of the French-German reconciliation. Bases that the parties could 
build on after 1945 were founded as the ideas were similar. Following the successes of the large-scale 
policy, numerous other very important steps were needed to minimise mutual mistrust in the peo-
ples of the two states. This led to a large number of various organisations and cooperations. The pat-
terns presented here greatly influenced communication after 1945. In the second part of the study 
the author presents the origin and effect of the Élysée Treaty with some new aspects of the history 
of diplomacy. Of the numerous new initiatives, the author focuses primarily on civil ones. The great 
innovation brought about by the treaty, however, was the strong involvement of the civil societies of 
both countries, particularly in education, research, culture and youth exchanges. As a result of his-
torical cooperation “Erbfeinde” (hereditary enemies) have become “Erbfreunde” (hereditary friends) 
within the European integration.
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On 22 January 1963, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the French President 
Charles de Gaulle signed a “Joint Declaration” and the “Treaty between the French Re-
public and the Federal Republic of Germany on French-German cooperation” in the 
“Salon Murat” of the Élysée Palace in Paris. This event largely influenced the future 
of Europe. Nowadays we are happy to claim that this treaty should seal the reconcili-
ation between the peoples of Germany and France. The aim of the Élysée Treaty was 
to turn enemies into friends. Thus the treaty laid the foundation for friendship be-
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tween the two countries and lasting peace in Europe. These are also features of the 
Treaty that are well known to the public. But what was really behind the treaty? What 
did the statesmen de Gaulle and Adenauer really have in mind when they carried out 
the ceremony? Which historical prototypes came to their aid? The intensification of 
relations between the two states after World War II was not an ad hoc idea. The aspi-
rations for cooperation, understanding, and reappraisal of the past and good neigh-
bourly relations had their roots — after decades of rivalry — in the interwar period. 
De Gaulle and Adenauer confirmed their mutual conviction in the agreement, that 
“the reconciliation between the German and French people, which ends a centuries-old ri-
valry, represents a historical event that fundamentally reshapes the relationship between 
the two nations”. But was it really such a great novelty what was enshrined in the 
Treaty? Weren’t there already early models that indicated such a “friendship treaty”? 
The background to the agreement was the recognition on both sides that a united 
and therefore peaceful Europe can only be achieved by increased cooperation be-
tween France and Germany. But this concept was not new. The first signs and the 
first attempts at implementation date back to the period after the First World War. In 
this contribution to the diplomatic history of Franco-German relations, I would like 
to illustrate these attempts and highlight a number of aspects of the creation of the 
Élysée Treaty and also emphasise the importance of the historical archetypes in the 
development of the ties between the two nations. At all times there were visionaries 
who were concerned about rapprochement and reconciliation efforts — politicians, 
intellectuals, citizens of both countries. They have all laid the foundation for the rec-
onciliation process that began after 1945. Nowadays the “French-German tandem” — 
after the opposition of a century — is considered the driving force of the integration 
in Europe. Their former opposition eased as a result of the perception of safety and 
their agreement contributed to further development of the European Union. My aim 
is to add some notes to a better understanding of the historical development trends, 
main personalities and exponents of the rapprochement and explain the diplomatic 
changes, from “grandeur” to “sécurité” and the “special relationship” of our times. 
1. CAPTURED BY “REVANCHE” AND “GLOIRE”
In the historical times of the 18th and 19th centuries, crises have shaped the mu-
tual relationship between the two nations, especially since the founding of the Ger-
man Reich after the Franco-German War in 1870–1871.2 These decades were again and 
2 The War between the Second French Empire of Napoleon III and the German states of the 
North German Confederation led by the Kingdom of Prussia under emperor William I is 
often referred as the Franco-Prussian War, but in our opinion it is right to speak of a Fran-
co-German war, since the war was the foundation stone for the creation of German uni-
ty. All German states that united in the German Reich in 1871 were allies of Prussia in the 
war. For more information see: H. von MOLTKE, The Franco-German war of 1870–71, Lon-
don 1891; D. WETZEL, A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 
1870–1871, Madison 2012; Online: “Franco-German War”. Britannica.com. Encyclopædia 
Britannica Inc. (Retrieved 18 January 2018).
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again marked by phases of tension and conflict, interrupted by phases of relaxation 
and peaceful coexistence or even “togetherness”.3 It is to be held: Napoleons̓ inter-
ventions in German politics, the attack on the Holy Roman Empire of the German 
Nation and the attempt to incorporate the Central German territories aroused deep 
concern not only in the affected territories. On the other hand, the French national 
pride was deeply injured when the German princes founded the German Empire in 
the centre of French culture and power on January 18. 1871, in the Hall of Mirrors, in 
Versailles. The French self-conception of a “grande nation” and a cultural and moral 
leading power of the time was severely damaged, which called for “revanche”. After 
an era of attempted rapprochement between 1876 and the end of the Bismarck period, 
the contrast with France in Germany was consolidated by a culture of vigilance and 
competition for “imperialist” world status. This constant contradiction forced almost 
the theory of the “Erbfeindschaft” (hereditary enmity), so that the struggle for power 
continued from generation to generation.4
This was no different at the time of the Great War, as contemporaries called the 
First World War. And even after the war, despite destruction, despite losses, despite 
Verdun, the symbolically exaggerated site of mutual suffering, despite collapse, rap-
prochement was hindered by several factors. The consequent global political and 
diplomatic situation did not facilitate the dialogue of the two countries. The ‘Tiger’ 
and the peace treaty of Versailles he imposed, then the provisions on compensation 
all made impossible for the two nations to reconcile.5 The notions of a just peace on 
the French and German sides were too contradictory. The essential factor was that, 
despite the international agreement, the fear of Germany remained in France. The 
newspaper L̓Echo de Paris wrote: “A great Germany can be born again: not tomorrow, 
but at the cost of a significant weakening on our part”.6 And Clemenceau said in a speech 
to the French Senate on 11 October 1919: “We are the masters. However, if we are to seek 
reconciliation for our children and for the future, we must make use of this rule with the nec-
essary moderation to ensure its permanence. If we do this, Germany is disarmed.”7 That was 
probably in the background why — as Yves Bizeul and Matthias Schulz put it — the 
first German democracy, the Weimar Republic reaped a peace that the authoritarian 
empire had substantially deserved.8
The so-called “grandeur” policy, which George Clemenceau and Raymond Poin-
caré followed, were aimed to suppress the Germans in order to provide security and 
economic development for the French state. Germany was deemed to be solely re-
3 For more information: R. POMMERIN — R. MARCOWITZ (Eds.), Quellen zu den deutsch-fran-
zösischen Beziehungen 1815–1919, Darmstadt 1997.
4 For more information: W. PABST, Das Jahrhundert der deutsch-französischen Konfrontation: 
Ein Quell- und Arbeitsbuch zur deutsch-französischen Geschichte von 1866 bis heute, Hannover 
1983.
5 F. HERRE, Deutsche und Franzosen: Der lange Weg zur Freundschaft, Bergisch-Gladbach 1985.
6 L’Echo de Paris, 12.11.1918, p. 3.
7 G. CLEMENCEAU, Discours de paix: Publiés par la Société des Amis de Georges Clemenceau, Par-
is 1938. p. 263.
8 Y. BIZEUL — M. SCHULZ, Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen Rückblick und aktueller 
Stand, Rostock 2000, p. 18.
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sponsible for the outbreak of war. This kind of French awareness of greatness was 
dreaming about a “French peace” and a Europe under French rule.9 The economic 
protectionism and political isolation fuelled German nationalism and thus revision-
ism instead of fighting it. As a result of this concept the conference in Genoa from 
10 to 19 May 1922 failed as well the Ruhr crisis afterward.10 France became the owner 
of the most important German industrial district by the occupation. French journal-
ist Raymond Recouly commented: “In summary, the following can be said: after a poor 
ceasefire, a treaty full of loopholes failed to resolve the most important issue on which, from 
an economic point of view, our future, even our existence depends: that of reparations.”11 
The policy of France aimed to establish the French economic power by uniting the 
iron ore of Alsace and the coal of Ruhr. Therefore it is not surprising that Chancellor 
Wilhelm Cuno took definite counter steps. Mainly because the political elite in Ger-
many back then, from Hugo Stinnes to Rathenau and Gustav Stresemann, wanted 
to prevent Germany from being robbed economically and keep owning coal for the 
German industry.12 Thus Chancellor Cuno promoted “passive opposition”, “refusal of 
compliance” and “general strike”. The French and Belgians reacted to the German 
resistance by expanding their occupation zone. In addition to the Ruhr area, other 
cities along the border with France (including Offenburg, Appenweier, Mannheim 
and Karlsruhe) were occupied.
Henry Kissinger revealed with the analytical method of the realist international 
school that German foreign policy had two options to choose: opposition questioning 
the peace at the same time, which required further efforts and sacrifices; and coop-
eration providing time for strengthening, which could demoralize the nation itself.13 
The decision Cuno made was aimed at making the identity of the new Republic of 
Weimar strong and keeping the picture of the enemy alive. Especially, because French 
diplomacy was trying to foster the disintegration of the German state from inside: 
by supporting different nonconformist movements with weapons and money, too. 
In Saxony and Thuringia power was taken by chambers of labour, a proletarian re-
bellion broke out in Hamburg, in Bavaria separatism appeared, while Rhineland was 
formally transformed to an independent republic and in the meantime Adolf Hitler’s 
national socialist group attempted the perform the Beer Hall Putsch.
2. HISTORICAL ROOTS AND PATTERNS OF UNDERSTANDING
Until 1923 France pursued a policy of containment, humiliation and isolation. The 
French historians Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariety rightly choose the image of 
a “cold war” to describe these years.14 But this policy did not lead to any goal… Cuno’s 
9 I. DIÓSZEGI, A hatalmi politika másfél évszázada, Budapest 1994, p. 286.
10 Ibidem, p. 296.
11 R. RECOULY, La Ruhr, Paris 1923, pp. 175–176.
12 M. ORMOS  — I. MAJOROS, Európa a nemzetközi küzdőtéren, Budapest 2003, pp. 302–303.
13 H. KISSINGER, Diplomácia, Budapest 1996, p. 265.
14 R. POIDEVIN — J. BARIÉTY, Frankreich und Deutschland: Die Geschichte ihrer Beziehungen 
1815–1975, München 1982, pp. 317–340.
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opposition and support for the nation generated only mock results while deepening 
the economic crisis in Germany: inflation was so high as never before mainly because 
one of Germany’s economic centres fell out. Also the French economy was affected 
similarly by the Ruhr adventure: French national budget remained unstable and the 
exchange rate of the French franc was the lowest ever. As regards domestic politics, 
the government of the “national block” started to become disintegrated. In this back-
ground Golo Mann correctly highlighted that in the economic-political situation by 
1924 all the three actors understood that peaceful solutions and self-criticism were 
essential.15 The French government ordered the evacuation of the Ruhr area in 1924. 
The rapprochement has also been called for in both countries by ever louder voices, 
such as in Germany by Heinrich Mann16 and many committed politicians of demo-
cratic parties such as the Reichstag President Paul Loebe (SPD), trade unionists and 
industrialists who supported the idea of Europe.17 In France it was mainly the politi-
cians of the so-called “cartel of the left” such as Leon Blum, Edouard Herriot, Joseph 
Caillaux and intellectuals, who, self-critically, also regarded the idea of revenge as 
a cause of the Great War.18 The French need for security was then to be satisfied by 
Germany s̓ integration into the peacekeeping system and its place in Europe. Politi-
cian and writer Louise Weiss, a co-founder of the magazine L̓ Europe Nouvelle, was of 
the opinion as early as 1921 that “the German people will not become democratic in one 
day and learn freedom; We must first of all take away the lords, allow them to decide freely 
about themselves and create in the heart of Europe a great, hardworking and pacifist democ-
racy that can contribute to the construction of Europe rather than work on its destruction.”
In France, gradually the policy called “sécurité” hallmarked by Aristide Briand 
took the leading role: “The followers of this approach believed that the recovery of Ger-
many cannot be hindered after more than one decade and this new Germany is going to be 
even stronger than France and its allies together. The German revenge may be avoided only 
if France makes concessions at an early stage to Germany and reconciles the German nation 
as well as protects French interests.”19 So Briand said in one of his speeches on reconcil-
iation policy: “It is said that the German people will hardly be inclined to accept the results 
of this war as definitive; it is not to be forgotten that at the end of every war there have been 
victors and defeated and that the morale of the defeated cannot be exactly the same as that 
of the victor. For a time, resentment and revenge persist, hopes, perhaps of an unhealthy 
nature, which could lead their bearers to new bloody conflicts. It takes quite a long time of 
effort to dispel all this. But it is up to the winner to do this. […] For the victorious France, it 
is honourable to speak such a language.”20 This concept started to spread after the rabid 
Poincaré left the government in June 1924. Gustav Stresemann became the head of the 
15 G. MANN, Deutsche Geschichte, Frankfurt 1958, p. 689; J. ARNAVON et al., De Versailles au 
plan Young: Réparations, dettes interalliées, reconstruction européenne, Paris 1932.
16 A. KANTOROWICZ, Unser natürlicher Freund: Heinrich Mann als Wegbereiter der deutsch-fran-
zösischen Verständigung, Lübeck 1972.
17 BIZEUL — SCHULZ, p. 20.
18 J.  BINOCHE, Histoire des relations franco-allemandes de 1789 á nos jours, Paris 1996, pp. 
147–152.
19 DIÓSZEGI, p. 268.
20 A. BRIAND, Frankreich und Deutschland, Dresden 1928, pp. 155–156.
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German government reflecting the French concept in September 1923. He was also 
willing to deal with the compliance of the peace terms in return to political dialogue 
and the French thaw. Already in 1923 he made it clear: “There can be no security in the 
future if we do not first of all move towards moral disarmament, without which material 
disarmament is not possible. […] We can choose. On the one hand, all the sufferings of war 
perpetuated by the spirit of revenge. On the other hand, a sincere reconciliation and the 
possibility of fruitful work.”21
Stresemann, who was leading the government for a short period, considered the 
history of France to make decisions. How did the loser power behave after the con-
gress in Vienna in 1815 and what was the first step the French took after the peace 
treaty of Frankfurt in 1871? Both cases clearly indicate that the defeated France 
was encouraging the ease of occupation first. For Germany it meant to stop the 
French-Belgian occupation of the Rhineland in order to establish the required mar-
gin for foreign policy. For this the German-French relationship had to be based on 
trust, which required to pay further compensation and avoid other retaliations by 
obvious declarations. But real foreign political objectives were aimed at the much 
desired revision. As it was proven in Stresemanns̓ confidential letter to Crown Prince 
Wilhelm dated September 7 1925 (made public in 1932) the German chancellor was 
aware that “several tricks” were needed to realize the real objectives. The security 
system of the West had to be entered to review the eastern borders and the accession 
of German-Austria.22 Nevertheless, traffic was resumed, which had amazing results, 
establishing the practice of resumption after 1945.
First Stresemann’s policy stabilized the economy, which generated overall devel-
opment, relatively high level of well-being, economic productivity and cultural boom 
for the period from 1924 to 1929 in the Weimar Republic. The exchange rate of the Ger-
man mark was stable, the economy normalized thanks to the loans and the Dawes-
plan of 1924, which also contributed to a relaxation in Franco-German relations. In 
1925 the production exceeded far beyond that of the last year in peace.23 
21 V. MARGUERITTE, Der Weg zum Frieden: Mit dem „Aufruf an die Gewissen“, Berlin 1925, p. 31.
22 “In my opinion, German foreign policy has three major tasks for the foreseeable future: Firstly, 
the solution of the reparations question in a way that is bearable for Germany and the securing of 
peace, which is the prerequisite for Germany’s re-invigoration. Secondly, I count the protection of 
the Germans abroad, those 10–12 million tribal comrades who now live under foreign yoke in for-
eign countries. The third major task is the correction of the eastern borders: the recovery of  Danzig, 
from the Polish corridor and a correction of the border in Upper Silesia. In the background is the 
connection of German-Austria […]. The most important thing is […] the liberation of German land 
from foreign occupation. We have to get the strangler off our backs first. That is why German pol-
icy in this respect will have to consist first of finessing (using tricks — editorʼs note) and avoiding 
the big decisions.” Published in Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung: Informationen zur 
politischen Bildung Nr. 261, in: Die Weimarer Republik, p. 37.
23 Also, Hjalmar Schacht, the Head of the Imperial Central Bank, had an important role as he 
established the German Gold Discount Bank in order to stabilize German mark. He was ap-
pointed the president of the supervisory committee. Schacht controlled banknote print-
ing, he was involved in planning the provisions of saving, re-regulating tax and customs 
issues — in accordance with the Dawes Plan — and setting permanent state incomes. 
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In the same year the Locarno treaties were signed. They were not based on dik-
tats already, but they were “agreements providing mutual advantages”.24 The Locarno 
Treaty was based on the understanding between Germany and France. France s̓ need 
for security had been respected, and Germany escaped political isolation by joining 
the League of Nations in September 1926. On the other hand, the set of agreements 
was still characterized by “the terms of a state and national sovereignty” and the two 
great Ministers of Foreign Affairs took steps on the basis of the “protection of sover-
eignty and the priority of national interests”.25
Thanks to the two ministers of foreign affairs, the relationship between Germany 
and France became so improved that negotiations — first in secret — could be started 
on further economic and political rapprochement. Obviously, Stresemann was work-
ing on the preparation of a revision, but the idea of expansion to a lager extent has 
not been known so far. He was interested in the territories lost already (Danzig, Sile-
sia) and German-Austria. The “thaw” in the west, on the contrary, meant higher se-
curity and stability for the French government, i.e. it was promising the success of 
the policy of the “sécurité”.
All of these established the possibility to realize the attempt of an agreement 
partly beyond national context: Stresemann proposed a German financial aid, Briand 
considered the emptying of the Rhineland as they realized that they mutually needed 
each other. France needed the German coal as well as Germany needed the French 
iron ore. The next actions were defined on 17 September 1926 in Thoiry, near Geneva, 
in a restaurant during a common lunch.26As a result of the negotiations, the example 
of a later European economic cooperation was born in September 1926: it was a cartel 
agreement of German, French, Belgian and Luxembourgian iron and steel factories 
(Stahlkartell or Internationale Rohstahlgemeinschaft — International Crued Steel 
Cartel). Austrian, Hungarian and Czechoslovakian firms also joined in 1927. 
These actions were internationally acknowledged. Consequently, Briand and Stre-
semann were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize shared in 1926. Moreover, the following 
year it was granted to two, a French and a German pacifist: Ferdinand Buisson, the 
founder and president of the International League of Peace and Freedom, and Ludwig 
Quidde, representing Germany at several peace conferences.
Cooperation also continued. According to the “spillover” theory on international 
integration, heavy industry encouraged German-French pharmaceutical firms to 
form cartels in 1927: the merger of the German IG Centrale des Matiéres colorantes 
(C.M.C) integrating French firms covering 80% of the German and French market. 
(It was also expanding when in 1929 the Swiss Basler Chemie and in 1931 the British 
Imperial Chemical Industries joined.) These economic initiatives started to establish 
the free circulation of varied products and raw materials, and exact regulation of the 
markets, raw material supply and job creation. As a result later several important 
plans were made to unite Europe economically. Ideas of large-scale industrial, eco-
nomic cooperation are known from 1932. They were also French-German initiatives. 
24 I. DIÓSZEGI, Briand and Stresemann, in: Rubicon, Nr. 10, 1993; F. BERBER (Ed.), Locarno: 
Eine Dokumenten-sammlung, Berlin 1936.
25 F. GAZDAG, Európai integráció és külpolitika, Budapest 2005, p. 61.
26 ORMOS — MAJOROS, pp. 314–315.
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Therefore, in 1932 the leaders of the French and German pharmaceutical and elec-
tronic industry met in Luxemburg, where the Germans suggested that the compen-
sation payments should be stopped in order to prevent the country from the national 
socialist and communist takeover. To improve further cooperation they developed 
the replacement of the American loans with the French funds and also the establish-
ment of a (German-Belgian-French-Luxembourgian) regional customs union. The 
latter one was an answer to the German-Austrian customs union, and André Tar-
dieu, French Prime Minister’s plan related to the establishment of a customs union 
along the Danube.27 However, all these ideas were eliminated by the upcoming global 
economic crisis.
Also, the nationalism, protectionism and populism that were generated by the 
economic crisis swept away the first ideas aiming at the European Union. The plans of 
a “European Union System” supported by John Maynard Keynes, the most significant 
economist of the era, which was based on the idea of the well-known Paneuropean 
Union and the thoughts of Briand, which was developed by Earl Richard Coudenhove 
Kalergi,28 also failed. Although several European politicians and intellectuals under-
stood the signs of the times and that a tragedy was to come as a result of the economic 
crisis, it was not time to encourage the European Union by two nations. Neither Stre-
semann, nor his successor, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, Julius 
Curtius, supported the idea of integration.29 Although Stresemann pointed out in his 
last speech to the League of Nations meeting that the economic and monetary frag-
mentation of the countries of Europe is considered an anachronism.30 This brought 
him closer to Briand, but the times were not yet ripe for closer cooperation.
Nonetheless, this period may be considered one of the most intensive periods 
of the French-German reconciliation. Bases that the parties could build on after 
1945 were founded as the ideas were similar. Following the successes of the large-
scale policy, numerous other very important steps were needed to minimise mu-
tual mistrust in the peoples of the two states. The mutual suspicion that Briand and 
Stresemann were able to overcome was still too deeply rooted in the thinking of 
both nations. Therefore, further steps had to be taken in the field of culture, ed-
ucation and everyday life. “The Union for the Agreement in Europe” (Verband für 
Europäische Verständigung / Fédération pour l’Entente Européenne) was established in 
1926 with divisions in Germany, France and Great Britain. The organization encour-
aged a Union of the Nations bringing the nations under one umbrella. One of its 
German founders, Wilhelm Heile, provided active assistance at the establishment of 
the European Committee. In the same year the “German-French Studying Commit-
tee” (Deutsch-Französischer Studienkommittee / Comité dʼInformation franco-allemand) 
started the operation based on the idea of a publicist, Pierre Viénot, in order to form 
27 In connection with the Danube region: L. T. VIZI, Duna-völgyi együttműködési kísérletek az 
1930-as évek első felében. Fejezetek a közép-európai integrációs törekvések történetéből, in: J. SI-
MON (Ed.), Civil társadalom és érdekképviselet Közép-Európában, Budapest 2012, pp. 17–33.
28 M. ORMOS, A Briand-terv és Magyarország, in: Rubicon, Nr. 5–6, 1997, p. 58.
29 I. NÉMETH, Európa-tervek. Eötvös, Budapest 2001, p. 227; ORMOS — MAJOROS, p. 319.
30 BIZEUL — SCHULZ, p. 21.
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a transnational, intellectual and cultural platform.31 At the same time, some Ger-
mans realized that the people of both countries did not differ significantly from each 
other. This would have enabled the members of the intellectual elite of both nations 
to inform their own publicity and contribute to the education, communication and 
reconciliation of wide societal layers. Emil Mayrisch, a large-scale industrial player, 
as the most important financial supporter who was thinking as a European citizen 
from Luxembourg, was behind the initiative. His idea of the International Crude 
Steel Community was quite successful.
The private law association based in Berlin, the German-French Society 
(Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft) published the newspaper titled “Deutsch-Fran-
zösische Rundschau”, edited by Otto Nikolaus Grautoff, university professor writer, 
translator (1876–1937). He was a convinced supporter of this mutual getting to know 
each other. Above all, he saw a good chance for the young people to play an interme-
diary role between Germany and France and therefore supported the society, just like 
personalities from Germany and France such as Konrad Adenauer, Albert Einstein, 
Thomas Mann, Georges Duhamel and André Gide, who also joined the first presi-
dency. The aim of the association was to promote an understanding between the two 
states and to create a forum for those interested in the neighbouring country. The 
statute of the association (dated 12 January 1928) noted as one of the most important 
aims “to contribute to a relaxation between the two countries and build bridges between 
France and Germany while preserving the national feeling of the two nations”.32 In this 
spirit the German-French Society has repeatedly organised study trips to France in 
order to immerse themselves in the intellectual and cultural life of the neighbouring 
country, or to get in touch with the relevant circles in Paris, which pursued the same 
goal of bringing the two peoples closer together. In addition, a central office would 
be set up for student correspondence and German and French speakers would be in-
vited to France and Germany time and again. On the last pages of each “Rundschau” 
issue, German-French events in France were announced on a regular basis and new 
publications in the German-French context were introduced.33
On the French side, the “Ligue d’ Etudes Germaniques” was created in 1928 in close 
cooperation with the German-French Society and the magazine “Spes”, which was 
later called “Se Connaître”. The partner paper of the “Rundschau” was later the French 
“Revue d’Allemagne”. With 12 working local groups, the “Ligue” was the strongest or-
ganisation in France, aiming to cooperate with the German civil organisations. The 
main focus was on the young people and high school and university teachers.34
31 G. MÜLLER, Deutsch-französische Gesellschaftsbeziehungen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Das 
Deutsch-Französische Studentenkomitee und der Europäische Kulturbund, München 2005, pp. 
81–106.
32 H. M. BOCK, Otto Grautoff und die Berliner Deutsch-Französische Gesellschaft, in: H. M. BOCK 
(Ed.), Französische Kultur im Berlin der Weimarer Republik. Kultureller Austausch und diploma-
tische Beziehungen, Tübingen 2005, p. 78.
33 Ibidem, pp. 80–100.
34 H. M. BOCK, Weimarer Intellektuelle und das Projekt Deutsch-Französischer Gesellschaftsver-
flechtung, in: R. HOHLS — I. SCHRÖDER — H. SIEGRIST (Eds), Europa und die Europäer. 
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The “European Cultural Union” (Europäischer Kulturbund, its full name is Interna-
tionaler Verband für kulturelle Zusammenarbeit / Fédération des Unions Intellectuelles) 
was an Austrian initiative, led by Prince Karl Anton Rohan. This inspired the Euro-
pean philosophers by a bit confusing but exciting mixture of ideologies (e.g. Cathol-
icism, the philosophy of Max Scheler and the poetry of Hofmannsthal and even the 
idea of the fascism).35 The most important forum of these intellectuals was the “Eu-
ropäische Revue” (Europe Review). The magazine received a great response throughout 
Europe: articles were cited in the “Figaro”, the “Times” and numerous other European 
newspapers. In France, the magazine was praised as a welcome symptom of the rap-
prochement of the European elites. The journal stayed away from political utopias 
and radical pacifism, concentrating instead on specific individual areas. Among the 
authors we can find almost all the most representative writers and authors of the in-
ter-war period: Thomas Mann, Alfons Paquet, Ignaz Seipel, Werner Sombart, Stefan 
Zweig, Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Alexander Rüstow, André Gide, Georges Duhamel, 
Paul Valéry, Paul Viénot, etc.36 The philosophers publishing and arguing in the Eu-
rope Review (Europäische Revue) were trying to predict the possible cultural future of 
Europe. In this basically private union, the most significant European philosophers 
met, who had only their European existence in common apart from politics, ideology, 
classes and races. Their slogan was ‘Understanding is the condition of agreement’. 
In 1924, the French writer Paul Valéry (1871–1945) developed thoughts on a pan-Eu-
ropean understanding in the “Revue Universelle” in an essay entitled “Caractères de 
l e̓sprit européen”. He compared Europe with a “huge city”, which is small enough to 
be crossed in a reasonable time, and large enough to accommodate different cul-
tures and regions. Therefore, it is not external commonalities that are important, but 
rather what can be built up together.37
These steps by the cultural and economic elite were not an end in themselves dur-
ing these years. They showed decades ahead and were considered to be the first steps 
towards the unification of Europe. These aspirations of individual politicians, econo-
mists and intellectuals were imbued with the will to integrate Europe, to which they 
assigned a peaceful, economic and cultural role. But history took a different path. 
There was no time for reconciliation. With the deaths of Stresemann in 1929 and Bri-
and in 1932, as well as the global economic crisis, the approaches to understanding 
disappeared from the scene once again. After 1933 understanding was impossible…
3. RESUMPTION OF THE FRENCH-GERMAN THAW AFTER 1945
After the horror of World War II the global scope of action radically changed for the 
states of Europe too. The old continent was unable to free itself from the war and the 
consequences and it depended on the powers outside Europe, the Soviet Union and 
the USA. However, this time the intervention of the two powers seemed permanent 
35 MÜLLER, pp. 363–379.
36 Ibidem, pp. 385–396.
37 P. VALÉRY, Caractères de lʼesprit européen, in: La Revue universelle, Vol. 18, Nr. 8, 1924, pp. 
132–142.
122 PRAGUE PAPERS ON THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2/2018
unlike after World War I. Leading powers of Europe had to conform to the decisions 
of other states and find possible solutions.38 Consequently, the German-French rela-
tionship no longer was a global system of relations with global influence. It was re-
stricted from the platform of global politics to a segment affecting the situation inside 
Europe (mainly Western Europe).
Their relationship — compared to the period after World War I — in the French 
politics is characterized by two distinctive trends. One is the idealist policy consid-
ering the Versailles Treaty the reason that made the system collapse — and in ac-
cordance with the opinion of several other contemporary philosophers — and want-
ing to remove the selfishness of the national state. This concept was focusing on the 
solidarity with the Germans, the sympathy with German movements of opposition 
and the new order of peace in a European Federation. According to the concept only 
the European collaboration and the elements beyond nations would provide the long 
term control over the German aggression.39
The leader of the temporary administration had different opinion about the “Ger-
man issue”. Instead of this idealist concept Charles de Gaulle recalled the “grandeur” 
concepts after World War I based on historical realities, and even communicated 
Clemenceau’s wildest ideas.40 France pushed for the division of Germany rather than 
the other two occupying powers, carried out denazification rigorously and used the 
occupied territories for its own economic interests. According to de Gaulle’s concept 
the French power may be established with strict regulations toward the Germans and 
the long argument of the old enemies may be finished only with the competence of 
the French. De Gaulle called for Germany to be divided into small, insignificant sub-
states and for the eastern border of France to be moved to the Rhine.41 Finally, in July 
1945, an agreement was reached on the “Directives pour notre action en Allemagne”: The 
left bank of the Rhine was to be controlled, Saarland was to be subject to a special 
policy, and the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate was to be granted special status. 
Economic potential should be used to build France. Considering the effort of the USA 
in Europe and the power desire of the Soviet Union, the governments of France were 
trying to balance between the western and the eastern allies all the time. However, 
while in the east the strict ideas toward the Germans were welcomed, the western 
allies were against the French politics. The Cold War changed the international coor-
dinate system: the United States and Great Britain insisted on an agreement of the 
occupation zones and wanted a more constructive German policy, including that of 
France. This path was slowly achieved by founding NATO and in the course of the 
Berlin crisis.42
The development after 1945 should have parallels to the period after the First 
World War: In both cases, France was anxious to achieve lasting protection from its 
38 GAZDAG, p. 62.
39 R. SCHUMAN, Európáért, Budapest 2004, p. 28.
40 GAZDAG, p. 72.
41 BIZEUL — SCHULZ, pp. 27–28.
42 R. HUDEMANN, Lehren aus dem Krieg. Neue Dimensionen in den deutsch-französischen Bezie-
hungen nach 1945, in: R. HOHLS — I. SCHRÖDER — H. SIEGRIST (Eds.), Europa und die Eu-
ropäer. Quellen und Essays zur modernen europäischen Geschichte, Stuttgart 2005, pp. 428–432.
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“hereditary enemy” on the other side of the Rhine, and both times this was to be 
achieved through fragmentation or total dissolution. The French fear of an overpow-
ering neighbor played a major role in the search for new solutions after the world 
wars and, after a period of “power politics”, led to reconciliation and European uni-
fication. The Cold War and the threat of communism in Europe led France to agree to 
the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949). According to French policy, 
however, the new state should be anchored in the western system of values in order 
to ensure political and economic control by the French. This was followed by the first 
official bilateral rapprochements between the two states: the settlement of the Saar-
land question and the German compensation payments to the victims of National 
Socialism in France.
The group that encouraged the reconciliation with the Germans had members 
mostly from the former Résistance, still insisting on the concepts with idealist and 
supranational ideas. They used to belong to very different political groups, linked in 
France to left-wing Catholicism and the idea of the European Federation, in Germany 
to liberal Catholic-Rhineland milieu and Jesuits. Emmanuel Mounier and Albert 
Béguin were two of the philosophers working around the periodical called “Revue 
Espirit”. Mounier, died 44 in 1950, was Catholic. He and Alfred Grosser, a French-Ger-
man sociologist from a Jewish family, established the forum called “Comité français 
d’échanges avec l’Allemagne nouvelle”. The group that involved also Albert Béguin, liter-
ary critic, published its ideas first in the Espirit in June 1947. Also left wing Catholics 
joined the common thinking, represented by Walter Dirks, writer-publicist, or Eugen 
Kogon, political scientist.43 Jean du Riveau, the Jesuit chaplain, published the first 
issue of the periodical “Documents-Dokumente” in two languages, in the French occu-
pied zone in August 1945. The objective of the still existing periodical was to deepen 
the dialogue between Germany and France by getting mutual and improved knowl-
edge about each other. The periodical publishing current topics of integration and 
analysis of French-German foreign affairs organized the first French-German meet-
ings across the borders after 1945. The authors, Emmanuel Mounier as well, empha-
sised that the whole German nation cannot be considered collectively guilty, but col-
lectively responsible based on how the history of the previous decades was assessed 
and it should involve Europe as a whole.44 Civil society organisations that worked 
together with the French military government quickly emerged. The oldest are the 
“Bureau international de liaison et de documentation” (BILD) and its German twin sister, 
the “Gesellschaft für supranationalale Zusammenarbeit” (GÜZ).
The most important motivation that the groups intending to reconcile with the 
Germans stressed the necessity of the French-German cooperation. Their opinion 
was that a free (i.e. not under communist influence) Europe could perform any long-
term integration only if its two central nations return to the policy of cooperation 
like before the war and the economic crisis. Even de Gaulle himself promoted such 
ideas related to the formation of the GFR.45 De Gaulle’s idea of Germany’s strong con-
43 A study on Eugen Kogon’s life and work with Walter Dirks in German: http://www.die-
neue-ordnung.de/Nr32004/AL.html (Retrieved 15 January 2018).
44 The website of Dokumente: http://www.zeitschrift-dokumente.de/index.php
45 G. ZIEBURA, Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit 1945, Pfullingen 1970, p. 49.
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trol was introduced into the political sphere, while the socialist integration concept 
was applied particularly in the cultural sphere. This let a new chapter begin in the 
history of the two nations, it seemed that “le duel franco-allemand paraît historique-
ment passé”, i.e. the period of the ancient French-German opposition finished. Espe-
cially, as Konrad Adenauer, the key player of the German politics after 1947, from the 
first moment he returned to politics, stood up for the cooperation with France and 
the European integration.46 The new players of politics in both countries succeeded in 
creating a link between French and Western European security interests, energy-po-
litical interests and constructive European involvement of the new Federal Republic.
This thinking led to the foundation of the Franco-German Institute in Ludwigs-
burg in 1948. Among the founding fathers were German Democrats such as the lawyer 
and later Federal Minister Carlo Schmid and the later first Federal President Theodor 
Heuss, while the historian and publicist Joseph Rovan and sociologist Alfred Grosser 
were on the French side. It was not only through politics that communication was 
to be achieved, but also through personal experience, which primarily included the 
language of the neighbor, but also lectures and events that gave information about 
life in the former “enemy country”. The European Youth Meeting at the Loreley in the 
summer of 1951 should not be forgotten, which was of great importance on the road to 
rapprochement and was an initiative of civil society organisations with some 35,000 
participants, mainly from the circle of Franco-German youth.47
Despite the positive developments, the “Section Française de lʼInternationale Ou-
vrière” (SFIO) warned in 1949 that the fears that still existed in France with regard 
to the future orientation of Germany should not be underestimated.48 Although the 
memory of the terrible events was still present so soon after the war, French readiness 
was great, to see the establishment of active cooperation in peaceful work and mutual 
trust between France and Germany. The interweaving of key industries, control of 
armaments, increasing prosperity through market integration, laying the foundation 
stone for a European federation and an economic community and overcoming the 
Franco-German contradiction were the broad objectives.49 An important step in this 
direction was economic cooperation between Germany and France. Without giving 
any details of the first phase of the European integration, the sectoral cooperation de-
rived from Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman’s concepts were significant and similar 
to the industrial cooperation of 1926 described above. The initiative from Christian 
democrats based on subsidiarity and solidarity (defined by the Catholic Church) was 
supported soon in the European countries: “It is not about the fusion of individual states 
to make a super power. States here in Europe historically exist, they cannot be eliminated 
psychologically. In fact diversity is welcomed and we do not want to make differences disap-
pear. But a union, a coherent power and cooperation is needed. […] In terms of politics the 
46 See: Deutschland und Frankreich: Ein Gespräch der Zeit mit Bundeskanzler Dr. Adenauer, in: Die 
Zeit, Vol. 4, Nr. 44, 03.11.1949, p. 1.
47 H. M. BOCK (Ed.), Projekt deutsch-französische Verständigung: Die Rolle der Zivilgesellschaft am 
Beispiel des Deutsch-Französischen Instituts in Ludwigsburg, Opladen 1998.
48 H. MÖLLER — K. HILDEBRAND (Eds.), Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und Frankreich: Do-
kumente 1949–1963; Vol. III: Parteien, Öffentlichkeit, Kultur, München 1997, p. 68.
49 BIZEUL — SCHULZ, p. 29.
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permanent agreement coming from inside between the states has to encourage the recovery 
of the peace in this divided Europe. To develop mutual agreement of neighbouring coun-
tries it is essential to reach the desired cooperation and common well-being.”50 Schuman’s 
thoughts were institutionalized by the European cooperations of the Coal and Steel 
Union and the Treaty of Rome. For the first time, the Federal Republic of Germany 
should be able to participate on an equal footing in a European post-war project and 
in the construction of a European institution. At the same time, a concept for the 
integration of Germany into the western community and the structures for the de-
velopment of European integration were born.51
4. THE ÉLYSÉE TREATY
While the integration of six countries started, Konrad Adenauer made an interest-
ing statement in an interview in 1950: He revealed his idea to Kingsbury Smith, jour-
nalist of the American International News Service, that was based on the idea of the 
German-French union during the war, the complete union of Germany and France 
should be realized. He also meant the complete merger of their economy and parlia-
ments as well as common citizenship. Adenauer thought it would fulfil the desire for 
security in France and the nationalism in Germany would also disappear.52 Naturally, 
Adenauer was motivated by the wellbeing of his close home, the Rhine, Ruhr and Saar 
regions in addition to his devotion to Europe. The union of the two countries was 
aimed to eliminate the competition for coal and steel, but wider stages of the French 
and German political elite found the Schuman Plan more improved for that.
But it was not only economic cooperation and expressions of sympathy on paper. 
In fact, town twinning started early on. In 1950, for example, Montbéliard and Lud-
wigsburg signed the contract for the first Franco-German town twinning. There have 
also been regular and trusting contacts between the two governments, as evidenced 
by the memoirs of the former ambassador in Bonn, Maurice Couve de Murville.53
But reality caught up again with the idealists. In particular because the lives of 
the two countries were rather different those years. In France that decade was the 
most confused and anxious period of current politics: Indochinese war, the Suez 
Case, rebellions in Algeria and the fall of the European Security Community (Pleven 
Plan), which was of key importance regarding integration. Political crisis resulted 
in an economic situation close to bankruptcy with huge budgetary deficit and lack 
of foreign exchange reserves. On the other hand, the other bank of the Rhein, due to 
the policy and social market economy of Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard the era was 
50 SCHUMAN, pp. 26–27.
51 C. A. WURM, Der Schuman-Plan. Frankreich und Europa, in: R. HOHLS — I. SCHRÖDER — 
H. SIEGRIST (Eds), Europa und die Europäer. Quellen und Essays zur modernen europäischen 
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52 J. MONNET, Emlékiratok, Budapest 2004, p. 325.
53 M. COUVE DE MURVILLE, Konrad Adenauer und Charles de Gaulle: Die dauerhaften Fun-
damente der Zusammenarbeit, in: F. KNIPPING — E. WEISENFELD (Eds.), Eine ungewöhnli-
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an “economic miracle” with full employment and complete national sovereignty (the 
GFR was member of the NATO). Voices requiring new politics were gradually louder 
in France demanding the return of the “Saviour of the home”.54 As Charles de Gaulle 
lived in the Colombey estate, which was the “island of peace” for him in solitude. Fi-
nally, in 1958 he returned to politics as the president with full power, creating a new 
constitution.55
De Gaulle’s political return was interestingly related to the halt of the European 
integration. Apparently, the cooperation stooped contrary to the Treaties of Roma 
and further actions was in danger. It was obvious that the common action behind 
the attempts for the union slackened after the pressure had weakened and several 
players had left the front line of politics that launched integration. The implemen-
tation of the concepts on the European Union was always driven by the unsolvable 
‘German issue’, as the most serious stage of the Cold War. At the moment when it 
was indicated that the bipolar system was consolidated and the nuclear stalemate 
would also hinder it, the political unity attempts in Western Europe stopped and 
particular national interests appeared. Dietrich Thränhardt even anticipated the 
fall of the supranational European dream in the Treaties of Rome as the Committee 
of Ministers delegated by the national states became the determining power, which 
destroyed the concepts of the “European Federal State”.56 Although this statement 
may seem exaggerating, it was true that in addition to the fall of the EDC (European 
Defence Community) and the role of the Council of Ministers, but mainly de Gaulle’s 
return slowed down the process of integration. The president was known — based 
on his communication while living retired — that he was against any supranational 
integration that would hurt or restrict the sovereignty of France. In his opinion 
“it cannot be tolerated that the well-being of a country cannot depend on the decisions 
and actions of another country, even if they have amicable relationship between them”.57 
A key question was therefore that what the attitude of the new president would be 
toward the new situation.
De Gaulle’s absolute objective — as it was indicated above — was to improve and 
recover the “grandeur”, i.e. the French power politics and the “gloire”, i.e. state glory. 
He wanted to provide France influence to the global politics as a new pole in the bi-
polar world. Consequently, he intended France to be a mediator between Washington 
and Moscow in political terms. However, he was aware that France was not strong 
alone to play that role. Therefore he tried to recruit the existing organizations of in-
tegration for his purposes. The European Europe regaining independence from the 
United States became an important element of his strategy of foreign policy. Its core 
was not the integration, but the frequent cooperation of the member nations.58 The 
French president wanted to build such cooperation between nations mainly with the 
FRG. The first step toward the cooperation was the de Gaulle-Adenauer meeting in 
54 F. GAZDAG, Franciaország története 1945–1995, Budapest 1996, pp. 132–135.
55 De Gaulle’s idea about the state in details: S. CSIZMADIA, Franciaország De Gaulle-tól De 
Gaulle-ig, in: Rubicon, Nr. 1–2, 2000, p. 76.
56 D. THRÄNHARDT, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Frankfurt 1996, p. 77.
57 KISSINGER, p. 598.
58 GAZDAG, p. 198.
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September 1958. The French statesman hosted the other right wing, conservative and 
Catholic politician in his family estate and their conversation was easier than he had 
expected. Especially when Adenauer could see the library of the French president, 
which involved the works of all great German writers and poets.59 Also the environ-
ment emphasised the uniqueness of the meeting: the French President never had 
invited and would invite statesmen other than the German Chancellor. This gesture 
expressed his personal respect toward Adenauer as well as the special importance 
of the French-German relationship. A further step was the unusual meeting in Bad 
Kreuznach a few weeks later. On 26 November 1958, the two giants of politics (de 
Gaulle was 193 cm tall, Adenauer 184 cm) met in the small spa town, where de Gaulle 
had also served as a soldier in the past.60 These two meetings laid the foundation for 
future trust. Maybe this was the first mentioning of the “European Europe” con-
cept de Gaulle wanted to get the support from the FRG. He explained in the concept 
that common actions of foreign policy should be made in the form of “organic rela-
tionships” not only toward the east of Europe, but the regions also further — inde-
pendently from the USA.61 De Gaulle’s concept considered the closer German-French 
relationship part of regaining the global power of France. He wanted to make use 
of the rapidly developing German economy within the EEC without having to pay 
high political price for it. The two states would be able to establish the self-defence 
of Europe, which would be guaranteed by the status of a nuclear power and an inde-
pendent nuclear arsenal (force de frappe). Thus, at the time of modern imperialism 
and internationalism “Gaulle-ism” was born. It was trying to count on the German 
state and the European cooperation.62 
The cooperation of the two old gentlemen greatly improved after they first meet-
ings. Adenauer and de Gaulle met 15 times personally and sent 40 official letters to 
each other altogether. Private conversations (both spoke the other’s language well) 
exceeded one hundred hours. The most epic moment of the French-German thaw 
must have been a row of events in July and September 1962. They could even be 
considered — with the expression László Salgó used — “the symbolic finale of the 
reconciliation of the two nations”. What Stresemann and Briand only managed to 
do in the beginning was continued and finalized by Adenauer and de Gaulle after 
the Second World War. As a result of the previous attempts at rapprochement, Ade-
nauer and de Gaulle realized that first of all the populations of both states had to be 
attuned to a more intensive relationship. The mutual state visits in 1962 served this 
purpose. A military parade took place at Mourmelon military camp to the honour 
of the visit in France. Standing on the same off-road vehicle Adenauer and de Gaulle 
were welcoming the marching French and German companies and returned the 
59 Adenauer — in terms of his own supranational and integration supporting concept — has 
considered Charles de Gaulle a nationalist surely capable of the representation of radical 
policy and imperialist, as Hermann Kusterer, the interpreter of the chancellor reported in 
an interview: Aus Feind wird Freund. Online: http://www.arte.tv/de/7233178.html
60 T. JANSEN, Die Entstehung des deutsch-französischen Vertrags vom 22. Januar 1963, in: D. BLU-
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salutation of the aircraft formations rumbling away. Then they attended a historic 
church service in the Cathedral of Reims, celebrated by Monseigneur Marty, Arch-
bishop of Reims. This mass for peace was highly symbolic: the city was occupied 
during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, became a martyred city in the First World 
War and was where the German military force signed the documents on the un-
conditional surrender to the Allies on 7 May 1945.63 The French president returned 
the visit between 4 and 9 September 1962. He made speeches in Hamburg, Köln, 
Stuttgart and Munich then in the Ruhr region in German promoting his concept 
of ‘the European confederation of Europe’. In his German-language speech in Lud-
wigsburg, he addressed the youth in particular: “While it remains the task of our two 
states to promote economic, political and cultural cooperation, it should be up to you and 
the French youth to encourage you and us to come ever closer together, to get to know each 
other better and to form closer ties. The future of our two countries, the cornerstone on 
which Europeʼs unity can and must be built, and the highest trump card for the freedom of 
the world remain mutual respect, trust and friendship between the people of France and 
Germany.”64 Publicity welcomed the thoughts of de Gaulle positively or was even 
celebrating him.
During the personal meetings and mutual conferences, the French president ex-
plained his concepts of closer cooperation to his German partner on 18 September 
1962. It was a short memorandum suggesting the coordination of foreign policy, pol-
icy of defence, educational and training issues between the two countries. De Gaulle 
wanted a political union of Europe that could stand on its own two feet and a Ger-
man-French axis that would determine it. He thus reached Adenauer’s ears because 
German relations with the young US president John F. Kennedy had fallen into a cri-
sis. The German response to the French concept arrived on 8 November indicating 
a few clarifications and corrections, but basically each suggestion was accepted. Fi-
nally, both ministers of foreign affairs, Gerhard Schröder (only the namesake of the 
later chancellor) and Maurice de Murville developed the final draft of the text in Paris 
on 16–17 December 1962.65
The governing parties in Germany were divided by the good relationship be-
tween Adenauer and de Gaulle as well as the improving cooperation of the two 
countries. The Christian democrat and Christian social politicians started a debate 
of two opposite concepts: One was the group that felt tension in the relationship 
with the USA, therefore they reviewed the alternative roles of Europe. The chancel-
lor, the Minister of Defence Franz-Josef Strauß and his Minister of Foreign Affairs 
were seeking for new ways. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the need to find solution 
by the dialogues between the Americans and the Russians was strengthening. In 
the nuclear stalemate the option of armed responses was minimal and the signs of 
reconciliation were more and more definite. All of these woke up the perception 
of danger of German politicians: what would happen if  the USA removed its de-
fence forces from Europe? As it was highlighted by the political scientist Hans-Peter 
Schwarz at the anniversary of the Elysée Treaty: the old chancellor could make use 
63 L. SALGÓ, De Gaulle diplomáciája, Budapest 1972, pp. 126–127.
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of a serious tool to put pressure on the USA whose policy he did not completely rely 
on.66 With such background most of the conservative catholic politicians, mainly 
from the south of Germany supported as close relationship as possible with France, 
and the “unusual marriage” of Adenauer and de Gaulle.67 The Gaulle-ist German 
politicians found the nuclear plant being developed a reliable alternative compared 
to the changing position of the Americans. The other German politicians belonging 
the governing party were supporting the “Atlanticists”, which did not want give up 
the close and traditionally good relationship with the leaders of the USA. They did 
not see alternative in the excessive relation to the French, but the destruction of 
the Atlantic relations and the danger threatening Germany. Additionally, the “At-
lanticists” feared even the fact that in the given situation, while the relationship 
between the German government and the USA was declining, the USA was turn-
ing toward the German opposition, the social democrats and refreshed its relations 
with the strong person of the SPD, the mayor of Berlin, the German “Kennedy”, 
Willy Brandt.68
While the negotiations started and resulted in quick success, with inner tension, 
the leaders of the German foreign policy did not think of conducting special bilateral 
treaty with France. They only visualized one joint declaration intensifying their co-
operation. However, elderly Adenauer, encouraged by domestic reasons, turned away 
from the German politics.69 He thought that a constitutional agreement bounding 
to his successors was essential to continue his heritage. Moreover, he thought that 
a treaty with foreign political coordinating mechanism could prevent France from 
establishing eastern policy with the Soviet Union without the FRG.
Thus after the short period of preparation, the treaty was finally concluded cer-
emonially on 22 January 1963, in the “Salon Murat” of the Élysée Palace. The docu-
ment was named “Treaty between the French Republic and the Federal Republic of 
Germany on French-German cooperation”. The core element of the treaty was the 
agreement that the two countries consult with each other on issues of foreign affairs 
to form a common point of view. This is facilitated by the meetings of the heads of the 
states and government leaders, the ministers of foreign affairs and education every 
half year, as well as the consultation of ministers of defence, and the meetings of 
the commander-in-chiefs and ministers of youth and sports every two month. Also 
this agreement included the mutual acceptance of higher education degrees, teach-
ing each other’s languages, the possibility of labour force swap and common policy 
of aiding developing countries. Additionally a commission between ministers was 
established in both countries for monitoring the cooperation. The treaty was rather 
a program than explaining exact tasks: implementing common negotiations, coor-
66 50 Jahre Elysée-Vertrag. „Wie die Schweine”, in: Die Zeit, Online: http://www.zeit.de/2013 
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69 See also about the urgent measures so caused by the so called “Spiegel Scandal”: 
K. SCHWABE (Ed.), Konrad Adenauer und Frankreich 1949–1963, Bonn 2005.
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dination of the relations with developing countries, common projects of weapons 
industry, swapping experience of those serving in the army, student swapping pro-
grams, mutual language learning programs, mutual acceptance of degrees and im-
plementation of common scientific projects.70 It is worth mentioning that economic 
issues were not involved in the treaty. On the one hand the cooperation of the two 
countries was so developed that the parties did not find further regulation of the 
topic important. On the other hand in terms of the European economic integration 
the French and the German ideas were quite different (which was later indicated by 
the “empty chair crisis”). Therefore it was reasonable that they did not intend to make 
a joint statement.71 The treaty created a frame and according to the German chancel-
lor’s concepts defined the future of the French-German cooperation. However, the 
implementation was performed by Adenauer and de Gaulle’s successors. They tried 
to prevent the treaty from interfering the ongoing European integration and the Eu-
ro-Atlantic relations.
In this context the process of the ratification of the treaty is a significant event of 
diplomacy. While the French National Assembly easily codified the treaty, the Bun-
destag in Germany — as a result of the political dividedness — attached a preamble 
by breaching the regulations of the international laws. This indicated serious Atlantic 
devotion: the foreign policy of the FRG based on the close relationship with the USA, 
the military integration realized in the NATO, the west European integration devel-
oping over the nations and the participation of Great Britain in the Common Market. 
In other words it is completely the opposite what de Gaulle imagined.72 However, it 
did not generate a dramatic turning point in the relationship of the two countries, 
rather the Elysée Treaty was a sample for several current initiatives of the European 
integration. For example, mutual acknowledgement of diplomats or the regular con-
ferences of the heads of government.
5. THE TREATY IN EVERYDAY LIFE — RESULTS OF 55 YEARS
After the treaty the relationship of the two states was tense as the French head of 
the government did not reach his objectives. He failed to separate German politics 
from the Anglo-Saxon federal system completely. De Gaulle’s direct environment was 
aware of his sanguine outbursts during which he was mentioning the termination 
of the treaty. It did not happen, moreover the document was celebrated as the “the 
key document of the French-German friendship” and the “fundamental pillar of the 
integration” at the 10th anniversary in 1973. When signing the treaty, de Gaulle use 
expressions that have become true: “there is no living human in the world who does not 
70 A. KIMMEL — P. JARDIN (Eds.), Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen seit 1963. Eine Doku-
mentation, Opladen 2002, pp. 40–49.
71 See: U. PFEIL, Zur Bedeutung des Élysée-Vertrags, in: Das Parlament, Nr. 1–3, 2013. Beilage: 
Deutschland und Frankreich. Online: http://www.das-parlament.de/2013/01–03/
Beilage/001.html (Retrieved 15 January 2018).
72 R. VON THADDEN, Privilegierte Partnerschaft: Der Elysée-Vertrag gestern — heute — morgen, 
in: Internationale Politik, Vol. 58, Nr. 1, 2003, pp. 45–48.
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understand the historical significance of this festive action […], we open the door of the fu-
ture Germany, France Europe and even the whole world wide.”73
The great innovation brought about by the treaty, however, was the strong in-
volvement of the civil societies of both countries, particularly in education, research, 
culture and youth exchanges. One key area of the cooperation was to facilitate the 
development of the youth; no wonder that one of the first organizations in 1963 was 
the “Deutsch-Französisches Jugendwerk” (Office franco-allemand pour la Jeunesse), which 
was a common swap program for the youth. It has supported 250,000 encounters 
so far, which have enabled around 7.5 million young people to discover their neigh-
bours.74 This success story of the DFJW led to other similar organisations, such as the 
foundation of the “Office franco-québécois pour la jeunesse” on the French side and the 
“Deutsch-Polnisches Jugendwerk” in Germany. Successful actions for mutual acknowl-
edgement of degrees and the educational cooperation resulted in the establishment 
of a common German-French University of Applied Sciences (Deutsch-Französische 
Hochschule), founded in 1999 at the Weimar Summit and consisting of a network of 
agreements between German and French universities. The administrative headquar-
ters are located in Saarbrücken.75 As a result 70 German and 80 French institutions 
work and issue common degrees of specific trainings and operate in a truly “bicul-
tural” spirit. But even more significant is that three dozens of bilingual kindergartens 
were established. Through the collaboration of one German and one French teacher 
in each group of the kindergarten, the children experience both languages in a nat-
ural way. In addition to language skills, intercultural competences are also being ex-
panded, the children gain an insight into the culture of the neighbouring country and 
are being educated to openness.76
On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Élysée Treaty, a Franco-Ger-
man Youth Parliament was held, which in its final communiqué proposed a joint 
Franco-German history book with identical content for both countries. This should 
reduce prejudices. The governments of the two countries then set up a binational 
project group to develop the concept for a three-volume textbook. In July 2006, vol-
ume 3 of the book “Histoire/History” was published with the title “Europe and the 
World since 1945”. The other two volumes “Europe and the World from the Congress 
of Vienna to 1945” and “Europe and the World from Antiquity to 1815” followed in 
the years thereafter (2008 and 2011). Since then, the Franco-German history book 
 
73 Quotes: R. LEICK, Die sich trauten. Online: http://www.arte.tv/de/7233176.html (Retrieved 
18 January 2018).
74 “The Youth Work has the task of building closer ties between the youth of the two countries and 
deepening their understanding of each other; to this end, it shall encourage, promote and, where 
appropriate, carry out youth encounters and youth exchanges itself.” KIMMEL — JARDIN, 
p. 483. For more details: C. DEFRANCE — U. PFEIL, 50 Jahre Deutsch-Französisches Jugendw-
erk, Berlin — Paris 2013.
75 Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung 
der Französischen Republik über die Gründung einer Deutsch-Französischen Hochschule. 
Online: https://www.dfh-ufa.org/ueber-die-dfh/weimarer-abkommen/ (Retrieved 22 Jan-
uary 2018).
76 KIMMEL — JARDIN, pp. 494–499.
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has been approved in both countries as a teaching aid for history lessons in the 
upper secondary school.77
Also to emphasize technical cooperation it is worth mentioning that the telecom-
munication satellite called Symphonie was constructed as a common French-Ger-
man project in 1967 as the benefit of the Élysée Treaty. After years of planning and 
technical development satellite Symphonie-A was successfully launched from the 
Kennedy Space Center in December 1974. The first action of the satellite was in Jan-
uary 1975 as President Valéry Giscard dʼEstaing of France and German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt exchanged their New Year greetings live in a videoconference. The 
satellite is the first geostationary telecommunications satellite built and operated in 
Europe with some ground-breaking technologies.78 As the resumption the common 
French-German satellite, the TV/AT-TDF, was constructed in the 70s, which provided 
the broadcasting of common TV (ARTE) and radio channels. ARTE is one of the most 
important cultural channels, even outside Europe. The European launcher Ariane had 
been constructed by the ‘80s, which transported weather, communication and geo-
logical observing satellites to the space.
However, it was not only everyday issues that led to a steady development of re-
lations between the two countries. Good relationship between German chancellors 
and French heads of government remained outstandingly important to encourage 
integration. In the ‘70s Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing made private 
initiatives to realize the first global economic summit (1975), for the submission by 
Schmidt and Giscard, the European Council (1974) was realized for the suggestion of 
Jean Monnet, according to the sample described in the Élysée Treaty, then in 1979 also 
encouraged by the same players the monetary cooperation was launched (ECU, EMS). 
The festive commemoration on 22 September 1984 at the military cemetery Douau-
mont near Verdun was outstanding in the relationship of the two countries. The par-
ticipants and millions of TV viewers could see the historic holding hands of François 
Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl. After the passport union was established between the 
two countries in 1985 (the precursor of the present Schegen zone) in September 1987 
the first common French-German military exercise took place near the Bavarian 
Manching. The Bundeswehr had 55,000 and the Force d’Action Rapide had 20,000 sol-
diers in the action which resulted in extremely important decisions on significant in-
itiatives. For the 25th anniversary of the Treaty, in 1988 a common Council of Defence 
and Security Policy (Deutsch-Französischer Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitsrat, DFVSR) 
and another common Financial and Economic Council (Deutsch-Französischer Finanz- 
und Wirtschaftsrat) were founded between the two countries, which later made the 
introduction of the euro much easier. In the city hall of Aachen (the seat of Charle-
magne) President François Mitterrand was speaking about the “common well-being” 
of the French and the German nations. All these were less important compared to the 
establishment of the French-German military brigade. But it was realized only more 
than one and a half year later due to the European progress of transformation and the 
77 Das Deutsch-Französische Geschichtsbuch. Online: https://www.france-allemagne.fr/
Das-deutsch-franzosische,1239.html (Retrieved 22 January 2018).
78 Symphonie unter den Sternen, in: Die Zeit, 3. Jan. 1975.
PéTER KRISZTIáN ZAcHAR 133
German unity movement on 17 October 1990.79 The common brigade may have been 
an example for the Eurocorps established in 1992 and the highest level of common 
conference of defence and security policy led to the development of the French-Ger-
man security and defensive concept published in 1996. Moreover, in the same year the 
German-French common brigade absolved the first military mission in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina. Since that date the brigade is an important element of the EU’s and NATO’s 
response capability and has been participating in missions around the world since 
2005, including in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Mali (EUTM).80
German reunification (1989/1990) has also only been able to afflict bilateral re-
lations for a  short time. The intensive talks between Helmut Kohl and François 
Mitterrand, however, were able to calm the mindset and thus make a decisive con-
tribution to the further development of the internal market, the conclusion of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the introduction of European monetary union and eastward en-
largement. France has demonstrated its special position in the Federal Republic of 
Germany since 1990 with its extensive economic and cultural investments in the new 
Länder.81 The collaboration of Kohl and Mitterrand — after the ones by Adenauer and 
de Gaulle, and Schmidt and Giscard d’Estaing — seemed historically significant; it 
was also found by the contemporary publicity as the two statesmen were granted the 
Charlemagne Prize shared.
In 2003, the 40th anniversary celebrations of the Élysée Treaty offered a very 
good opportunity for Franco-German cooperation. For this reason, new symbolic 
steps were taken, including the holding of the first Franco-German Council of Min-
isters, a joint meeting of the Assemblée nationale and the Bundestag in Versailles, and 
a meeting of the Youth Parliament in Berlin. The President of the French Republic, 
Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder adopted a joint statement on this 
occasion. It praised the achievements of four decades of Franco-German cooperation 
and promised the continuation of the “Franco-German tandem” with a deepening of 
bilateral cooperation and an explicit European focus. They sent a message to those 
having historical affinity: the nations succeeded in getting over the grievance felt by 
the French in 1871 and by the Germans in 1919. Now together, visualizing a new pic-
ture of the future, they are expecting the current challenges of the European Union. 
Also an example to follow is the creation of dual citizenship not existing before, and 
the foundation of a common foreign mission in Podgorica in 2003. Gerhard Schröder, 
German chancellor, could not only inaugurate a common German-French police and 
border control cooperative centre based in Kehl, but was invited first in the history to 
79 About the formation and operation of the common brigade see the detailed documentary 
of ARTE television: Unter zwei Flaggen. Online: http://www.arte.tv/de/7260748.html (Re-
trieved 18 January 2018).
80 V. MARSAI, Foreign Military Intervention in Mali — The Background of Opération Serval, 
in: SVKK Elemzések — Center For Strategic And Defense Studies Analyses, Vol. 1, 2013; 
É. REMEK, The European Union and the Sahel Region: Focus on the Crisis in Mali and the EUTM 
Mali, in: B. BILTSIK — A. MARENGO — N. POSTA — P. K. ZACHAR (Eds.), New Approach-
es in a Complex World: International Relations, History and Social Sciences, Budapest 2014, pp. 
143–154.
81 BIZEUL — SCHULZ, pp. 36–37.
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a central commemoration of World War II, the 50th anniversary of the battle of Nor-
mandy.82 The friendly hug of Jacques Chirac and Schröder was a worthy continuing 
of the gestures taken by the ancestors.
The so-called “Blaesheim-initiative” also fits into this series: these are the infor-
mal talks between the heads of state and government of France and Germany and 
their foreign ministers initiated in the Alsatian town of Blaesheim near Strasbourg at 
the beginning of 2001. President Chirac and Chancellor Schröder had agreed to meet 
every six to eight weeks in the future. This tradition was also continued by Chancellor 
Angela Merkel. She made her first trip abroad as German Chancellor to France on 23 
November 2005. Chancellor Merkel made it clear that this is not only a traditional 
ritual of German foreign politics, but rather that the quick inaugural visit underlines 
her deep conviction that a good Franco-German relationship is important for both 
countries and equally important for Europe.
Since then, the recurring anniversaries have enabled a steady development. The 
two states celebrated the 50th anniversary with common initiatives again. The most 
outstanding is a 2 euro coin, which is issued in the member states. On the back the 
portraits of Adenauer and de Gaulle and the bilingual texts “50 years — 2013” and 
“Élysée Treaty” were graved. Also it is a unique stamp, which is going to be issued in 
Germany with the value of 75 euro cents and (maybe as the symbol of the “unusual 
marriage”?) on which a man and a woman are watching the future through a common 
telescope. Its left lens is coloured with the German and its right lens with the French 
national colours.83 Also the two fast train networks, the French TGV and the German 
ICE are going to be connected and the cross border medical supply is planned, and 
a common German-French military training institution has already began operation 
in the suburb of Kabul for the Afghan non-commissioned officers.84
This year, Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron 
issued a joint statement on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the event. Once 
again, they noted that Franco-German friendship is a cornerstone of European inte-
gration. France and Germany are striving to further expand Franco-German coop-
eration in order to meet the political, social, economic and technological challenges 
of the coming decades and to develop common positions on all important European 
and international issues. In this spirit, the French President and the Chancellor have 
agreed to vote on a new Élysée Treaty in 2018. The most important issues are the deep-
ening of economic integration, the development of cooperation in civil society, and 
an expansion of cooperation based on trust in the field of foreign, defense, security 
and development policy.85
82 See more details: http://www.deutschland-frankreich.diplo.de/Geschichte-der-deutsch, 
1501.html
83 See more details: http://www.ambafrance-de.org/50-Jahre-Elysee-Vertrag-mit-2-Euro
84 A. HETTYEY, A vonakodó szövetséges? — Németország külföldi katonai bevetései a viták és 
a számok tükrében, in: Külügyi Szemle, Nr. 1, 2014, pp. 69–87.
85 Gemeinsame Erklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und dem französis-
chen Präsidenten Emmanuel Macron anlässlich des 55.  Jahrestages der Unterzeich-
nung des Vertrags über die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit vom 22. Januar 1963 
(„Élysée-Vertrag”). Online: https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Pressemittei-
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All this symbolizes well: the two nations are essential players in the formation of 
the European politics. It is a fact that Germany and France have not been in the same 
league for years. It is the task of political scientists to analyse whether Germany has 
become too strong, as France feared in the period immediately after reunification. Or 
the other way around: perhaps France has become too weak among its last couple of 
presidents and has left Germany unconsciously in charge of dealing with the count-
less crises in Europe. Whatever the case, a renewed strengthening of mutual rela-
tions is the focus of the current political leadership. Because they know the results of 
history: Regarding directly measurable results of the German-French cooperation, 
the first is the positive impacts of the stable political connections on the society and 
the economy. The common dependence of the two nations is the key and condition 
of further integration. Today, the network of joint Franco-German structures and 
institutions is unique. It is also supported by decades of close personal ties between 
the citizens of both countries, which are reflected in numerous city and regional 
partnerships. For the past fifty-five years this connection has been indicated by more 
than 2200 twin city relations, over 350 cooperative actions of research organizations. 
Today the “motor function” of the two countries cannot be denied. In this process, 
the historical reconciliation, the special connection that was realized by the Élysée 
Treaty, were the landmarks of the period. They were able to give an outstanding con-
tent to the rigid international law that may be an example for other nations carry-
ing various historical harms. To cut only one segment briefly: In the reorientation 
of German-Polish relations after the fall of communism, cooperation was not only 
expanded in the field of foreign policy, but also attempted to transfer it into society: 
in this way, a common culture of remembrance was sought to profile and expand 
existing commonalities. Today, Polish and German scientists are more likely to find 
a common voice in the assessment of historical processes. Working together on both 
sidesʼ past has also led to French-style exchange programmes, language courses and 
joint textbooks. These relations in the societies of the two states are nowadays also 
emphasized in science by the so-called “histoire croisée”.86 In our historical account of 
French-German cooperation, however, we can no longer do justice to this claim be-
cause of the diplomatic-historical focus of our study. This remains as a task for a fur-
ther analysis of the subject area. That is why we can only make a simple statement 
based on the presented development: “Erbfeinde” (hereditary enemies) have become 
“Erbfreunde” (hereditary friends) in the 20th century; the quest for “grandeur” that 
has been felt on both sides time and time again in the past has been replaced by a “spe-
cial relationship” and this opens up a further deepening cooperation for the future.
lungen/BPA/2018/01/2018-01-21-gemeinsame-erklaerung-55-jahre-elysee-vertrag.html 
(Retrieved 25 January 2018)
86 The histoire croisée (Verflechtungsgeschichte, Intertwining History) was developed by Béné-
dicte Zimmermann and Michael Werner. It is a new trend for multi-perspective histori-
ography of transnational history, inspired by the French social sciences, and is based on 
criticism of comparative and transfer-oriented approaches. M. WERNER — B. ZIMMER-
MANN, Beyond Comparison. Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity, in: History and 
Theory. Studies in the Philosophy of History, Vol. 45, 2006, pp. 30–50.
